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NEURAL NETS AND THEIR INTEGRATION 
WITH PRINCIPLES FROM OTHER DOMAINS.
THE CASE OF QUANTUM THEORY AND FRACTALS
1. Introduction
Nowadays, neural nets are considered as a method that can be used on its own in 
a number of contexts, but that can be used in a larger domain when integrated with 
principles from other domains. Usually, one uses principles from other ai-domains 
(genetic algorithms, fuzzy logic, etc.) in order to enlarge the scope of a network. We 
briefly explain in this paper how such an integration can be enlarged to include princi­
ples from quantum theory and from fractals as well.
2. Connectionist models and the variable binding problem
Since the appearance of the three volumes of Parallel Distributed Processing 
(Rumelhart and Me Clelland, 1986), connectionist models are at the focus of cognitive 
research. Although the precise value of these models is still a matter of dispute, it is 
fairly generally recognized that they have been a step forward in our understanding of 
a wide range of cognitive and perceptual processes. At the basis of their success is 
their capacity to perform fast pattern recognition, to work with soft constraints, and to 
learn from experience. However, most connectionist models suffer from the inability to 
solve the variable binding problem. In criticisms on the connectionist paradigm, this is 
generally a central point. In order to illustrate the problem, consider the sentence 'Mary 
receives a red shirt from John', and suppose that we represent this sentence in a con- 
nectionist network. More specifically, suppose that we use a local network in which 
every predicate, every object and every verb are represented by a single unit.
The problem with this representation is that also the sentences 'John receives a 
red shirt from Mary', 'Red John receives Mary from a shirt, and so on, have an identical 
representation. Hence, this type of representation is unable to represent patterns in 
which an object and a predicate are bound together, or patterns in which it must be 
clear if an object is the first or the second argument of a verb. More general, this sort of 
connectionist representation is not suited to represent constituent structure: when a 
pattern of activation is given, it is not possible to differentiate within this pattern sub- 
patterns that are bound together.
One way to solve this problem is to introduce auxiliary binding units, and to split 
a verb or a relation in a number of units that equals its number of arguments. Accord­
ing to this representation, the bindings between the units can be detected if their con­
nections with the binding units are examined (Shastri and Feldman, 1986).
A person who is communicating or who is interacting with his environment has to 
represent continuously new structures with bound variables. If he would do so with 
help of binding units and binding connections, he constantly would have to generate 
and to skip connections. However, it is rather unlikely that there exists in the brain a 
mechanism that can support such widespread changes at a timescale of hundreds of 
milliseconds. Hence, a binding unit approach can not be considered as a solution for 
the variable binding problem of short term cognitive processes; at most, it may play a 
role in long term memory. Therefore, a solution that solves the binding problem with 
binding units and binding connections is called a solution with 'static' bindings. If we 
want to describe how new information is manipulated and how it is integrated in long 
term memory, we must look for a solution with 'dynamic' bindings.
3. The SHRUTI model and dynamic variable binding.
Recently, Shastri and Ajjanagadde (1993) proposed a new connectionist model 
with the aim to solve the variable binding problem. Like its authors, we will refer to 
this model as the SHRUTI network. Consider the example of section 1 again: 'Mary 
receives a red shirt from John'. For this sentence, the variable binding problem can be 
solved if the same mark is attached to constituent elements that belong together. For 
instance, 'red', 'shirt' and 'receive:object' may receive mark '1', 'Mary' and 'receive: 
subject' may receive mark '2', and so on. According to this approach, a unit must be 
able to support different markers instead of a single activation value.
The idea to extend the number of variables that is associated with a single neural 
unit is in a sense fairly natural. In real neurons, one often not only detects a degree of 
activation, but also temporal variables like a phase and a frequency. In principle, a fre­
quency can be used as a marker that determines which units are bound together in a 
distributed pattern of activation. In effect, this suggestion has been made, for instance, 
in the domain of perception (Eckbom, Reitboeck et al., 1990; Engel, Koenig et al., 
1991). Alternatively, a marker may refer to the phase of a neural unit. According to 
this perspective, neurons have the same marker if they are firing in synchrony. This 
possibility is defended in Shastri and Ajjanagadde (1993). We will not discuss how 
precisely markers may be represented in the brain. For our purpose, it is sufficient to 
notice that connectionist models that include markers can soive the variable binding 
problem. If we take a more abstract perspective, we can notice that the idea of using
markers in networks has a predecessor: also in the marker passing system NETL 
(Fahlman, 1979), different markers are circulating in the network. NETL is able per­
form cognitive operations like class intersection and some types of rule following. 
However, unlike SHRUTI, NETL needs a central controller that is constantly super­
vising and directing the process of marker passing. In this sense, it is unlike a connec- 
tionist model.
We have noticed how markers allow to represent information in which variables 
are bound together. SHRUTI also represents rules. Consider the rules ’if person 1 re­
ceives an object from person 2, then person 1 owns the object', and ’if a person owns 
an object, then he can sell it'. In figure 3, 'to own' is represented by units corresponding 
to 'owmsubject' and 'own:object'; similarly, 'can sell' is represented by 'can sell:subject' 
and 'can sell:object'. Each of these rules is represented by two links. For instance, the 
first rule is represented by a link from 'receive:subiect' to 'own:subject', and a link from 
'receive:objecf to 'own:object'. These links pass the marker of the source unit to the 
destination unit. For instance, if 'Mary' has marker '2', then also 'owmsubject', and, 
subsequently, 'can sellisubject' receive marker '2'. This way, the system can quickly in­
fer a large number of facts every time an input pattern is presented. The specific pat­
tern of connections of the net guarantees that variables are bound together in an appro­
priate way.
Along with rules and incoming information, SHRUTI also represents long term 
memories of facts. A fact is represented by a single unit. In order to be able to address 
facts, relational terms must be provided with query- and answer-units. Fact-units, 
query-units and answer-units are active or inactive; they do not have to generate mark­
ers. The query unit and an the answer unit corresponding with 'to receive' allow to ask 
if there are facts in long term memory in which objects or persons are related by the 
verb 'to receive'. Suppose, for instance, that 'Mary receives a shirt from John' is en­
coded as a long term memory item, and suppose that the system is asked 'Did Mary re­
ceive a shirt from John?'. Since the question involves the verb 'to receive', the query- 
unit of 'to receive’ is put active. At the same moment, all units that are involved in the 
question are put active, and they are provided with appropriate markers. The incoming 
connections to the fact unit 'Mary receives a shirt from John' are wired in such a way 
that the fact unit becomes active when (i) its constituent elements are active and have 
appropriate markers and (ii) the query unit of 'to receive' is active. The activity of the 
fact unit is propagated to the answer unit to which it sends information. When the latter 
becomes active, the question is confirmed.
SHRUTI allows for a type of backward reasoning in which a question is con­
verted a number of times in alternative questions. As a more detailed examination of
this system shows, the evidence for these questions may be searched along various 
paths. If evidence is found for an alternative question, then the answer to the latter 
question is propagated until an answer to the original question is obtained. In sum, this 
model has a number of attractive features. It exploits the concept of marker passing 
without being dependent on a central processor. As a consequence, it is a connectionist 
model that is able to bind variables and to perform different types of inference types. 
However, it suffers from four drawbacks:
(i) Since facts are stored as single units, they are not content addressable. This 
entails that a crucial advantage of connectionist models over computational ones is 
given up.
(ii) The pattern of activation that results when a pattern is presented as an external 
input differs profoundly from the pattern of activation that is obtained when facts in 
long term memory are examined. As a consequence, reasoning with these different 
types of patters occurs in a different way: in case of a long term memory pattern, rea­
soning must be in terms of queries and answers, whereas input patterns can generate 
forward reasoning. This asymmetric situation is impractical and has no psychological 
basis.
(iii) The network can generate a number of cognitive processes, but it is not so 
clear what it adds to our understanding of them. Ideally, a connectionist model is more 
than a brain-style implementation of a process that can be described equally well with 
help of more classical tools. The point that SHRUTI is wiring out operations that can 
also be described by classical models becomes more sharp when its details are exam­
ined further. It appears that the resulting pattern of connectivity is highly specific, and, 
more importantly, that a learning rule for the connections is not provided (Touretzky 
and Fahlman, 1993).
(iv) In a thought process, a concept or a property can enter in more than one rela­
tion. For instance, in the utterance 'The black dog has black puppies’, the node corre­
sponding to 'black' must be allowed to have two markers. Alternatively, different nodes 
that correspond to 'black' must be present in the network. Shastri and Ajjanagadde 
(1993) choose for the latter option. Due to the variety of inferences that the system is 
claimed to master, this entails that every concept- or property-node should be dupli­
cated a number of times.
In the next section, we propose a model that includes the conception of markers, 
but that has an attractor dynamics, so that it does not suffer from problem (i). The pat­
tern of activation that results if a fact is presented as an input is identical with the pat­
tern of activation that results if a fact is retrieved from long term memory, so that 
problem (ii) does not occur. Rules are represented in an implicit way, and their effect
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can be understood in terms of the attractor dynamics of the network (see problem iii). 
The learning rule of the schema model is suited to store facts as well as implicit rules 
in this system. Finally, a single unit may have different markers at the same time, so 
that also problem (iv) does not apply.
4. QNET: A quantum mechanical neural network
QNET takes the pattern of connectivity of the so called schema-model as its point 
of departure, but it allows that the state of a unit i is characterized by a set of different 
values A / (f=l to n) instead of by a single value. We call the value A,f the ’amplitude* 
of the f-th frequency in unit i. This terminology is borrowed from physics; there, it 
would refer to a temporal pattern in i that can be decomposed in n discrete ground- 
modes. The fact that, in every unit, only a discrete number of groundmodes contribute 
to the state of the unit is a first point that reminds us of quantum theory. A detailed ex­
amination of QNET reveals several other such facts (note 1). The amplitudes of the 
frequencies in every unit have a function comparable to the one of markers. Let us 
consider a simple example. Suppose that n=3, which means that three different fre­
quencies are allowed to contribute to the state of a unit. Then, every unit is character­
ized by a vector with three components. Consider the example of section 1: 'Mary re­
ceives a red shirt from John’. Suppose that the unit ’shirt' is activated in the first 
frequency, i.e. its activation state is characterized by (1,0,0). Then, the units which are 
bound to this unit are also activated in the first frequency. Similarly, if the state of acti­
vation of'Mary' is (0,1,0), then also 'receive:subject' must be activated in the second 
frequency, and so on.
We allow that amplitudes vary continuously and that, in the same unit, more than 
one amplitude differs from zero. If the latter fact occurs, this means that a concept or a 
descriptor participates in more than one set of bounded variables. In QNET, the chance 
that a unit interacts with another one is determined by the square of amplitudes, 
whereas the information that is exchanged is proportional to the amplitudes them­
selves. It has been shown that this entails that the network can process distributed in­
formation concurrently in different frequencies (compare this with a quantum com­
puter that computes in synchronously in 'different worlds'). Moreover, these 
frequencies interfere in such a way that the activity in one frequency prohibits the oc­
currence of a spurious solution in other frequencies. Since the occurrence of spurious 
solutions is a major problem in constraint satisfaction neural networks, it can be under­
stood that QNET has proven to offer a viable connectionist solution for a wide class of 
constraint satisfaction problems.
QNET is a new type of connectionist model. It reconciles two approaches. On the 
one hand, a number of authors recently argued that the type of coherence that is found 
at a quantum level may be vital in brain processes and in cognitive processes too 
(Penrose, 1989, Lockwood, 1989, Deutsch 1985). On the other hand, neural networks 
have already acquired a central place in present day cognitive science. QNET recon­
ciles these inspirations by the way of a neural net that integrates quantum principles. 
As a result, it allows to represent more internal structure and internal coherence than 
the schema model does; the additional coherence may be used, for instance, to solve 
the variable binding problem.
The integration of quantum principles in QNET bears no mysterious concepts. 
QNET can be straightforwardly simulated and even a hardware implementation would 
probably not be dramatically much harder than a hardware implementation of more 
classical recurrent neural nets. QNET is not dependent on the production of SQUIDS, 
or on any other quantum mechanical hardware components, in contradistinction with 
other proposals for quantum computers. Most importantly, we have shown that QNET 
has a number of fairly relevant practical applications in AI and cognitive science. 
Along with its new solution for the variable binding problem, it allows to search con­
currently for different global solutions in constraint satisfaction problems. If different 
solutions are equally attracting a given network state, then QNET will give these dif­
ferent solutions; a more classical neural net, on the other hand, frequently gets trapped 
in a spurious state. In such conditions, QNET generates different solutions with high 
internal harmony instead of a single solution with unsatisfactory internal harmony. 
Therefore, we suggest that integrating principles from quantum theory is a relevant en­
richment of neural network methodology. In the next sections, we argue that a similar 
point can be made with respect to fractal theory.
5. Neural nets: passive and constructive classifications
Neural nets and their applications have been studied extensively in cognitive 
contexts. At the same time, properties of wholes of sub-networks have been examined. 
Such wholes have been compared with the human brain, and extensive simulations 
have compared capacities of artificial systems with human cognitive capacities (Van 
Loocke, 1990; 1991; 1994a; 1994b; 1995; 1996a; 1996d; 1996e; 1995f; 1996g; 1997a; 
Vandamme en Van Loocke, 1993). Among the artificial systems, connectionist ones 
appear to be especially suited to create classes with help of which differentiations can 
be introduced for the surrounding world (Ripley, 1996). Recent connectionist systems 
show that different types of codes are used to encode different types of stimuli. Also,
different codes are suited as input for different types of further processing (Kosslyn, 
1993; Van Loocke, 1996c).
Recently, the distinction between passive and constructive classification came to 
the foreground. In a passive classification process, the stream of information is domi­
nantly one-directional, and a stimulus is transformed in representations that are succes­
sively more abstract. In a constructive classification process, the classifying system 
generates in parallel a large number of codes, and it examines which codes fits best a 
(pre-processed) stimulus. In case of the human brain, visual processing is largely con­
structive (Kosslyn en Sussman, 1995; Edelman, 1989; Van Loocke, 1996e; 1997a). In 
order to simulate this fact, networks have been proposed that are active in different 
frequencies and that can generate a different constructions in every frequency. These 
constructions evolve in accordance with a typically connectionist algorithm, but also 
under the influence of a genetic algorithm (Van Loocke, 1996e; 1997a). In special 
when a (multi)-fractal code of a landscape has to be determined, this approach appears 
to be particularly promising.
The problem of finding the fractal code for a landscape can be expressed as an 
optimalisation problem that is not expressible by a bi-linear function. Genetic algo­
rithms (but not neural networks) can construct solutions for such problems. By embed­
ding the algorithm in a neural network, the memory capacities of neural networks can 
nevertheless be used in combination with he genetic approach (Van Loocke, 1996a; 
1997a). This approach to the coding problem works well for natural landscapes, but it 
appears to be rather clumsy when human-made environments have to processed. For 
such stimuli, classical generative 3D codes (in the sense of D. Marr; see Marr, 1982; 
Biederman, 1987) appear to be better suited. Another class of stimuli that may demand 
for still another type of code concerns non-verbal communication by facial expression; 
such expressions appear to be representable efficiently by means of wavelets. The ro­
bustness of the division of visual stimuli in three classes is currently examined; pre­
liminary results indeed suggest that there are (at least) three classes of visual stimuli to 
be differentiated.
Fractal codes are very compact. Hence, a connectionist system that classifies on 
basis of such codes can work with a relatively low number of input units. It is currently 
investigated if backpropagation neural networks do classify landscapes in aesthetical 
classes in the same way as humans do. In fact, humans classify landscapes in a re­
markably uniform way in aesthetic classes (Kaplan cn Kaplan, 1989), so that the ques­
tion if a compact fractal code lends itself for such a classification is meaningful.
6. Ecological and political implications
When landscapes that an be coded in a fractal way are systematically destroyed 
in favor of man-made environments, then human systems specialized in fractal proc­
essing receive less exercise. As a consequence, the skills to make aesthetical appre­
ciations of such landscapes may be damaged. As a result, the opposition against the 
destruction of human nature becomes less strong. This way, a circular process results, 
during which both the external environment as well as the human cognitive skills are 
changed. Man risks to loose a skill that played a vital role since his appearance on 
earth. Moreover, since the fractal processing of stimuli is embedded in a complex web 
of other cognitive operations, the elimination of the corresponding type of stimuli may 
have consequences for other operations also. Current research examines if also man- 
made environments can be constructed in such a way that the fractal type of processing 
can be (partially) used. This type of work is of obvious relevance for landscape poli­
tics.
References
Biederman, K. (1987), Recognition by components: a theory of human image un­
derstanding, Psychological Review, 94, 115-147
Deutsch, D. (1985), Quantum theory, the Church-Turing principle and the univer­
sal quantum computer, Proceedings of the Royal Society, A400,97-117
Eckhom, R., Reitboeck, H., Arndt, M., Dicke, P. (1990), Feature linking via syn­
chronization among distributed assemblies: simulations of results from cat visual cor­
tex, Neural computation, 2, 293-307
Edelman, G. (1989), The remembered present,New York: Basic 
Engel, A., Koenig, P., Kreiter, A., Gray, C. Singer, W. (1991), Temporal coding 
by coherent oscillations as a potential solution to the binding problem: physiological 
evidence, in: Schuster, H., Singer, W. (eds.), Nonlinear dynamics and neural networks, 
Weinheim
Fahlman, S.E. (1979), NETL: A system for representing real-world knowledge, 
MIT Press
Kaplan, S. , Kaplan, R. (1989), The experience of nature: a psychological per­
spective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Kossyn, S., Chabris, C. (1992), Categorical versus coordinate spatial relations, 
Journal of experimental psychology: human perception and performance, 18, 562-577 
Kosslyn, S., Sussman, A. (1995), Roles of imagery in peception, in M. Gazzaniga 
(ed.), The cognitive neurosciences, 103 5-1042
Lockwood, М. (1989), Mind, brain and the quantum, Blackwell 
Marr, D. (1982), Vision, San Francisco: Freeman
Musgrave, K. (1994), Fractal landscapes in context, in K. Musgrave (ed.), ACM 
Interactions, 385-396
Penrose, R. (1989), The emperor's new mind, Oxford Press 
Petrosky, Т., Prigogine, I. (1995), Роіпсагй resonances and the extension of clas­
sical dynamics, Chaos, solitons and fractals, 7, 441-497
Ripley, B. (1996), Pattern recognition and neural networks, Cambridge: Cam­
bridge University Press
Rumelhart, D., Smolensky, P., Me Clelland, J., Hinton, G. (1986), Schemata and 
sequential thought processes in PDP models, in : Me Clelland, J., Rumelhart, D., Par­
allel distributed processing: explorations in the microstructure of cognition, vol 2, MIT 
Press
Shastri, L., Feldman, J. (1986), Semantic nets, neural nets and routines, in: Shar­
key, N. (ed.): Advance in cognitive science, Ellis Harwood/Wiley
Shastri, L., Ajjanagadde, V. (1993), From simple associations to systematic rea­
soning: a connectionist representation of rules, variables and dynamic bindings using 
temporal synchrony, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16,417-494
Vandamme, F., Van Loocke, Ph. (eds.) New trends in neural networks, Ghent: 
Communication and Cognition
Van Loocke, Ph. (1990), Neural networks and higher mental processes: providing 
a Boltzmann network with meta-layers, Cognitive systems, 2-4,1990, p. 383-409
Van Loocke, Ph. (1991), Study of a neural network with a meta-layer, Connection 
Science, 4, 1991, p. 367-379
Van Loocke, Ph. (1993), Neural nets: black boxes or interpretable models? Pro­
ceedings of the 18-th International Conference on Information Technologies and Pro­
gramming, Sofia, p. 76-100
Van Loocke, Ph. (1994a), The dynamics of concepts. A connectionist model, 
Berlin/' Heidelberg/ New York: Springer Verlag
Van Loocke, Ph. (1994b), Properties of the conceptual database of the right hemi­
sphere, Cognitive Systems, 4, 75-91
Van Loocke, Ph. (1994c), Connectionisme en natuurfilosofie. Een onderzoek naar 
enkele mogelijkheden tot concrete interactie, Gent: Communication and Cognition 
Van Loocke, Ph. (1995a), QNET: A quantum mechanical neural network. A new 
connectionist architecture and its relevance for variable binding and constraint satis­
faction problems, Cybemetica 38(1), 85-106
Van Loocke, Ph. (1995b), Nieuwe types van concepten in de Prigoginiaanse 
natuurfilosofie, in: Vandamme, F., Van Loocke, Ph.: Capita Selecta uit de Toegepaste 
Epistemologie, Volume IV, Gent: Communication and Cognition
Van Loocke, Ph. (1996a), The introduction of principles from elementary quan­
tum theory in a Hopfield-style network and the solution of constraint satisfaction and 
variable binding problems, in: Dagli, C., Akay, M., Chen, P., Fernandez, B., Ghosh, J. 
(eds.), Smart engineering systems: neural networks, fuzzy logic and evolutionary pro­
gramming, ASME Press, pp. 129-136
Van Loocke, Ph. (1996b), Een relatie tussen actuele epistemologische thema's en 
ecologische thema's, in Vromen, J. (ed.), Acta van de 18-de Vlaams-Nederlandse 
Filosofiedag, pp. 141-147
Van Loocke, Ph. (1996c), On the properties of a network that associates on basis 
of share of components and its relation with the conceptual memory of the right 
hemispere, in: Van Loocke, Ph. (ed.), Concepts in human cognitive activities, Com­
munication of Cognition, 29(3-4)
Van Loocke, Ph. (1996d), Concepts: Representations and evolution, in Van 
Loocke, Ph. (ed.): Concepts: representation and evolution, Philosophica, 57
Van Loocke, Ph. (1996e), in van Loocke, Ph. (ed.): The connectionist model 
QNET and its combination with genetic algoritms, in Van Loocke, Ph., Concepts: rep­
resentation and evolution, Philosophica, 57
Van Loocke, Ph (1996f) Complex aesthetic patterns in a recurrent neural net­
work and their relevance for widespread communication, in: Van Loocke, Ph. (ed.), 
Concepts and Complex systems, CCAI: the Journal for the Integrated Study of Artifi­
cial Intelligence, Cognitive Science and Applied Epistemology, 13(3)
Van Loocke, Ph. (1996g) (ed.), Concepts and complex systems, CCai: the Journal 
for the Integrated Study of Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science and Applied 
Epistemology, 13(3)
Van Loocke, Ph. (1997a) (ed.), The nature and evolution of concepts, New York: 
Routledge (appears in winter 1997)
Van Loocke, Ph. (1997b), De metafysica van het bewustzijn. Een historisch per- 
spectief, In Vandamme, F., Van Loocke, Ph. (eds.), Capita selecta uit de Toegepaste 
Epistemologie VI, Gent: Communication and Cognition
Van Loocke, Ph. (1997c), Kennisleer en milieufilosofie. Verschuivingen in cog- 
nitieve operaties in historisch perspectief, in Vandamme, F. Van Loocke, Ph. (eds.), 
Capita Selecta uit de Toegepast Epistemologie VI, Gent: Communication and Cogni­
tion.
